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How Constitutional Law Casebooks 
Perpetuate the Myth of Judicial Supremacy 
Neal Devins 
T HE MoaE THINGS CHANGE, the more they stay the same. In 1977, Henry Monaghan spoke 
of the "widely held and deep belief' that 
the study of constitutional law should be 
undertaken through a 'aetailed examination of 
Supreme Court decisions, albeit supple-
mented in varying degrees by authors' ques-
tions and law review excerpts:'1 With Burger 
Court rulings on forced busing and abortion 
rights fueling a nationwide debate over judicial 
policymaking, the continuing vitality of this 
case-centered approach seemed secure. 
More than two decades later, Professor 
Monaghans depiction of constitutional law 
casebooks still rings true. Not only do 
Supreme Court decisions remain the stuff of 
the constitutional law course, casebook 
authors - in providing context to Court deci-
sions - rarely venture outside the familiar ter-
rain of academic commentary and author 
questions. Likewise, as was the case in 1977, 
the popular press still treats United States 
Supreme Court rulings as definitive. For The 
Washington Post's Joan Biskupic: "The Justices 
are the final arbiter of what is in the Constitu-
tion;" for The New York Times' Linda Green-
house: "[T]he Supreme Court [is] the 
ultimate arbiter of constitutional bound-
aries:'2, 
Unlike 1977, however, academics no longer 
see the Supreme Court as the leading (let 
alone ultimate) interpreter of the Constitu-
tion. Rather, academics now question the 
Court's ability to effectuate social change 
(some calling it a "hollow hope") and, as such, 
call for the Court to issue "minimalist" deci-
sions - decisions that allow popularly elected 
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I Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 90 HARV. 1. RBV. 1362, (1977). 
2, Joan Biskupic, The Shrinking Docket, WASH. POST, March 18, 1996, at A15; Linda Greenhouse, Cases 
Give Court Chance to Define Church and State, NY TIMBS, Sept. 19, 1999, at AI. 
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government to playa leadership role in defin-
ing constitutional norms} Relatedly, by seeing 
Court decisionmaking as the byproduct of 
social and political forces, academics increas-
ingly speak of the constitutional dialogues that 
take place between the Supreme Court and 
elected officials.4 More striking, some aca-
demics speak either of "constitutional 
moments" in which the people - through elec-
tions and the like - effectively amend the Con-
stitution or of populist constitutionalist 
discourse in which the courts would steer clear 
of constitutional interpretation altogether.5 
The gulf between what academics say to 
their colleagues (through scholarship) and 
their students (through casebooks) is truly 
remarkable. More to the point, one reason 
why the myth of judicial supremacy persists is 
that academics (who teach law students, 
undergraduates, and - on occasion - journal-
ists) do not practice what they preach. In the 
pages that follow; I will sketch out some expla-
nations for why it is that constitutional law 
casebooks treat Supreme Court decisions as 
final and definitive. Before doing so, however, I 
will call attention to the myriad ways that the 
elected branches shape constitutional values 
(and how it is that constitutional law case-
books give short shrift to elected branch 
influences). 
Most landmark Supreme Court decisions 
cannot be understood without first paying 
attention to the politics surrounding them.6 
What follows are seven explanations as to why 
this is so: 
First, Justices pay attention to politics in 
crafting their decisions. John Marshall's 
sequencing of merits and jurisdiction in Mar-
bury v. Madison and Earl Warren's efforts at 
crafting a unanimous opinion in Brown v. 
Board of Education were both preemptive strikes 
designed to limit the political repercussions of 
unpopular decisions. Other examples include 
Cooper v. Aaron (where the Supreme Court 
declared itself "the ultimate interpreter of the 
Constitution" after President Dwight Eisen-
hower secured compliance with court-ordered 
desegregation by sending Army troops into 
Little Rock) and the Steel Seizure case (where 
the Courts willingness to invalidate President 
Harry Truman's war-time seizure of the steel 
mills was directly tied to public opinion). 
Second, politics is informative in assessing 
Supreme Court doctrine. Legislation limiting 
the impact of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority speaks to whether, as the 
Court held in Garcia, states' rights concerns 
are adequately represented in Congress. Anal-
ysis of the decision to defer to military deci-
sionmaking in Korematsu v. United States should 
take into account that the internment of Japa-
nese-Americans was a subterfuge devised by 
the military and approved by the Justice 
Department. 
Third, political judgments shape Court 
doctrine. In Brown v. Board, a highly influential 
Solicitor General brief emphasized how segre-
3 See, e.g., Gerald N . Rosenberg, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991); Cass R. Sun stein, ONE CASE AT A TIME 
(1999). 
4 See, e.g., Robert G. McCloskey (revised by Sanford Levinson), THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 
(2d ed., 1994); Michael]. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. 
REv. I (1996); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. 1.. REv. 577 (1993). 
5 Bruce Ackerman, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Mark Tushnet, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
6 Lou Fisher and I have written a collection of twenty-five studies of the politics surrounding 
landmark Court decisions. Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OP CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (2d ed. 1996). The examples that follow all come from that collection. 
260 3 GREEN BAG 20 259 
How Constitutional Law Casebooks Perpetuate the Myth ofJudicial Supremacy 
gation undermined America's status as leader 
of the free world and, as such, strengthened 
Russia's hand in the Cold War.7 Even more 
significant, Congress's choice to ground the 
public accommodations section of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act in the Commerce Clause 
allowed the Court to treat Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States and Katzenbach v. McClung 
as commerce cases. Likewise, by expanding 
Justice Department authority in independent 
counsel investigations, 1987 amendments to 
the Ethics in Government Act proved critical 
to Morrison v. Olson. 
Fourth, politics contributes to the ultimate 
meaning of Court action. The institutional 
dynamics that made the legislative veto so 
popular before I.N.S. v. Chadha explains why 
the device continues to be used - well over 
three hundred legislative vetoes have been put 
into place since the decision. Likewise, 
through funding and other restrictions, Court 
decisions on abortion and school. busing were 
undercut by Congress and the White House. 
Moreover, the limits of Brown (where the 
Court delegated its remedial authority to 
Southern district court judges) are under-
scored by mid-sixties elected branch reforms 
which resulted in more desegregation in 1965 
than in the decade following Brown. 
Fifth, populist resistance to Court decision-
making often prompts the Court to recalibrate 
its position. Public support of Roosevelt's 
New Deal initiatives prompted the so-called 
"switch in time" and, with it, the demise of the 
Lochner Court. On abortion and school bus-
ing, elected branch disapproval may well have 
contributed to the Rehnquist Courts modera-
tion of Burger Court decisionmaking. 
Sixth, even when the Court upholds govern-
mental action, elected officials sometimes con-
clude that the Court was in error and that 
corrective action is necessary. Wimess, for 
example, Andrew Jacksons declaration that, 
notwithstanding McCulloch v. Maryland, Con-
gress was without authority to establish a 
national bank. More recently, Court decisions 
on women in the military, voting rights, and 
homosexual sodomy have been neutered 
through state and federal legislation. 
And seventh, elected officials often spin 
Court decisions in partisan ways. On war 
powers, presidents have seized upon dicta in 
Curtiss-Wright to assert plenary authority over 
the decision to send troops into battle. On 
affirmative action, President Bill Clinton pro-
claimed that a decision mandating strict SCtu-
tiny review of race preferences did little more 
than reaffirm the need for affirmative action. 
The lesson here is simple (and one, I think, 
that most authors of constitutional law texts 
agree with): The practice of constitutional law 
must take into account that constitutional 
decisionmaking is the province of the elected 
branches as well as the judiciary. Therefore, 
good attorneys must be able to advance their 
interests in both sectors. Sometimes the 
courts will prove most responsive to a consti-
tutional claim, but on many occasions consti-
tutional claims are more effectively advanced 
before legislative committees (where prece-
dent-based arguments are often ineffective). 
Even in court, especially the Supreme Court, 
an advocate - at least some of the time -
should take socio-political context into 
account. 
Along these lines, the infusion of politics 
into the constitutional law course seems 
necessary, not simply a luxury. Exposure to 
nonjudicial interpretation helps students 
understand both Supreme Court decision-
making and the critical role that elected 
officials play in shaping constitutional values. 
7 For similar reasons, the Solicitor General played a critical role in Korematsu. Here, however, the 
Solicitor General perpetuated inequality by suppressing evidence suggesting that the internment 
was rooted in racial bias, not military necessity. 
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With so much scholarship now talking about 
the Constitution outside of Court, moreover, 
one would expect that recently published con-
stitutional law texts would take nonjudicial 
interpretations into account. 
Think again. Constitutional law texts (even 
those published in the past few years) pay 
scant attention to nonjudicial interpretations. 
Of the five leading texts I examined, only one 
(coauthored by Paul Brest and Sandy 
Levinson)8 treated nonjudicial interpretation 
as an important part of the constitutional law 
course. The other four9 barely mention 
nonjudicial interpretation. And even Brest-
Levinson was highly selective in its consider-
ation of nonjudicial interpretation. None of 
the five texts, for example, discusses elected 
government resistance to court-ordered bus-
ing or IN.S. v. Chadha. None discusses the 
government's briefs in Brown or Korematsu 
(although two texts hint at government mis-
representations in Korematsu). None mentions 
legislative action undertaken in response to 
Court decisions on women in the military, 
voting rights, and homosexual sodomy. None 
mentions presidential interpretations of Court 
decisions on affirmative action or war pow-
ers. IO None mentions that the Court's claim of 
judicial exclusivity in Cooper occurred after 
federal troops took over the Little Rock school 
system. None sets out to demonstrate how it 
is that politics entered into John Marshall's 
decision in Marbury, although two of the 
five provide substantial background material 
about the political context of the decision. 
None mentions public opposition to Trumans 
seizing of the steel mills, although three of the 
five contain some contextual information 
about the seizure. Only one considers the 
factual context of Brown. Only one mentions 
legislative deliberations about grounding the 
I964 Civil Rights Act in the Commerce 
Clause. Only one mentions legislation enacted 
in response to Garcia. Only two mention legis-
lative efforts to undo Roe v. Wade (and both 
only consider proposed human life legisla-
tion). To their credit, most of the books men-
tion Roosevelt's court-packing proposal, the 
pivotal role that Congress played in accelerat-
ing the pace of school desegregation, and 
Andrew Jackson's claim that McCulloch was 
wrongly decided. Overall, however, constitu-
tional law texts do a poor to horrible job in 
calling attention to the myriad ways that 
elected officials shape constitutional values.1I 
Why is it that casebook authors (some of 
whom have made significant contributions to 
the nonjudicial interpretation literature) 
adhere to the traditionalist case and academic 
commentary model? After all, the inclusion of 
substantive nonjudicial materials makes the 
constitutional law course both more accurate 
and more useful. Moreover, since legal academ-
ics no longer defend judicial supremacy in their 
scholarship, one would think that a retrofitting 
of the constitutional law casebook would be a 
welcome - even inevitable - development. 
8 Brest & Levinson, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING (3d ed. 1992). 
9 Gunther & Sullivan (13th ed. 1997); Lockhart et al. (8th ed. 1996); Stone et al. (3d ed. 1996); Farber 
et al. (2d ed. 1998). 
10 On war powers, however, all constitutional law texts contain some discussion of the War Powers 
Resolution. Some texts, moreover, provide information on presidential implementation of the 
Resolution. 
11 Limitations in constitutional law texts will not always translate into limitations in the constitutional 
law course. For example, some constitutional law professors may discuss the role of nonjudicial 
interpretations in their classes. Most, however, will not consider the Constitution outside of courts. 
Unlike other disciplines, law professors (especially professors of mainstream courses) typically build 
their courses around the materials contained in comprehensive case books. 
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Having coauthored a supplemental text on 
the political dynamics of constitutional law (a 
book whose sales would skyrocket if academ-
ics saw nonjudicial influences as critical to the 
constitutional law course), I have thought 
some about the stagnancy of constitutional 
law texts. The simplest and, I suspect, most 
accurate explanation for this phenomenon is 
that old habits die hard. Law professors are 
used to teaching from casebooks dedicated to 
Supreme Court decisions and academic com-
mentary. Casebook authors are used to writ-
ing such tomes. More to the point, most 
casebook authors are schooled in the reading 
of cases and academic commentary, not legis-
lative and executive branch materials. Conse-
quently, a significant retrofitting of an existing 
casebook would take a tremendous amount of 
time and energy. For a casebook author to 
make such an investment, she would need to 
be convinced (a) that it is the right thing to do, 
(b) that she has the time to invest in such an 
undertaking, (c) that her casebook would 
need to include such material in order to lead 
law professor~ to include it in their teaching, 
and (d) that her market share will not be 
harmed by such an investment. In other 
words, before there is a fundamental change in 
the constitutional law casebook, casebook 
authors and their law professor constituents 
must believe that nonjudicial interpretations 
are central both to Supreme Court doctrine 
and the practice of constitutional law. Indeed, 
in order to overcome the burden of inertia, 
professors of constitutional law would need to 
think that it would be professional miscon-
duct not to teach their students about nonjudi-
cial interpretations. 
Perhaps this transformation is inevitable. 
The degree to which scholars now dismiss the 
Supreme Court as the predominant source of 
constitutional law prompted Mike Paulsen (in 
responding to commentators on his paper on 
executive branch power to interpret the Con-
stitution) to ask: "Will nobody defend judicial 
supremacy anymorer"12 Over time, casebook 
authors - assuming the persistence of this 
burgeoning scholarly consensus - might see 
the incorporation of nonjudicial materials into 
their texts as an idea whose time has come.13 
I think not, however. My suspicion, instead, 
is that casebook authors will do little more 
than expand upon the few pages they now 
dedicate to the finality of Supreme Court deci-
sions. In part, my skepticism is fueled by the 
fact that law professors who write on this 
topic focus on the legitimacy of nonjudicial 
interpretation, not the nuts and bolts of how it 
is that elected officials and the people shape 
constitutional values. "Unfortunately," as 
Sandy Levinson remarked, "there is no really 
good comprehensive presentation of the con-
stitutionallaw that is made by presidents, con-
gress, administrative agencies, and ordinary 
citizens in addition to that which is made by 
the courts.,,14 
But there are more deep seated reasons for 
the persistence of the case and academic com-
mentary model. The status of both casebook 
authors and professors of constitutional law is 
12 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to Professors Levinson and 
Eisgruber, 83 GEO. L.J. 385, 385 ([994). 
[3 Unlike [977-era authors of constitutional law texts, casebook authors today can access data sources 
(Westlaw, Lexis, and the like) that make it relatively easy to incorporate nonjudicial materials into 
their texts. Of course, as Gerry Rosenberg suggests, the thoughtful integration of political science 
into constitutional law texts may require more time and energy than law professors seem willing to 
invest. See Gerald Rosenberg, Across the Great Divide, 3 GREEN BAG 20 267 (2000). Law professors, 
however, are skilled at preparing legislative histories and, consequently, are well positioned to 
integrate nonjudicial interpretations into their texts. 
[4 McCloskey, supra at 237. 
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enhanced by adherence to the Court-centered 
model. For law professors, the case and aca-
demic commentary model communicates that 
that which they are expert in matters the most 
in the teaching/practice of constitutional law. 
Specifically, if the Supreme Court is seen as a 
somewhat closed system (speaking the last 
word on constitutional issues), the language of 
lawyers becomes the language of constitu-
tional law. In contrast, were the decisions of 
the Supreme Court seen as part of a broader 
socio-political mosaic, lawyer training and, 
with it, law professor expertise would matter 
less. Consequently, constitutional law case-
books are a celebration of what law professors 
were trained to do (read cases and write briefs) 
and what law professors do in their scholar-
ship (write academic commentary - much of 
which assesses Supreme Court decisionmak-
ing) . For law professor authors of these case-
books, their status is similarly enhanced by the 
current regime. The case and academic com-
mentary model validates both their lawyer 
training and their scholarship. Moreover, in 
selecting what academic writings are worth 
including in constitutional law texts, the case 
and commentary model enables casebook 
authors to serve as gatekeepers of academic 
writing and thereby enhances their status vis-
a-vis other professors of constitutionallaw.ls 
In saying that the case and academic com-
mentary model maximizes the status of con-
stitutional law professors, I do not mean to 
suggest that there is a conscious conspiracy 
within the legal academic community to per-
petuate the myth of judicial supremacy. Most 
law professors see the teaching of doctrine as 
their principal duty to their students and, as 
such, are reluctant to sacrifice the teaching of 
doctrine in order to make room for politics. In 
constitutional law; this is especially true. 
There is too much to cover in the course and, 
consequently, most of us have to eliminate 
cases that we consider monumentally impor-
tant. Nevertheless, if judicial supremacy is a 
myth, professors of constitutional law should 
readily trade off the teaching of some doctrine. 
In particular, to the extent that politics 
explains doctrine, exposure to a cases socio-
political setting is necessary to the teaching of 
doctrine. 16 For this reason, the line separating 
a commitment to only teaching landmark 
Supreme Court decisions from a deep seated 
belief in judicial supremacy is, at least, blurred. 
The constitutional law casebook, while des-
15 At first blush, this analysis suggests that constitutional law texts written by and marketed to 
political scientists would pay considerably more attention to nonjudicial interpretation than law 
school texts. But it is also possible that the political science marketplace is affected by an incentive 
scheme that closely resembles the legal academic marketplace. For example, it may be that the 
political scientists who write constitutional law texts (and the professors who teach from these 
texts) see the reading of cases as a skill which separates them from their colleagues (who teach and 
write about Congress and the Presidency). 
16 In this and other ways, the incorporation of nonjudicial materials does not stand in the way of the 
teaching of doctrine. My students, for the most part, are better able to understand a decision when 
they have a better sense of the case's socio-political context. For some students, learning about 
context makes them more interested in the case; for other students, learning about context helps 
them understand the Court's reasoning. Accordingly, I think Suzanna Sherry is wrong when she 
claims that the teaching of nonjudicial materials diverts a student's attention away from the "law" in 
constitutional law. See Suzanna Sherry, The Law Professor as Schizophrenic, 3 GRBEN BAG 20 273 
(2000) . For identical reasons, Sherry goes too far in equating the teaching of nonjudicial materials 
(something which is inextricably linked to doctrine) with the teaching of game theory, comparative 
constitutional law, and the like (something which is "interesting and relevant"). 
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perately in need of a retooling, is likely to 
remain more-or-less the same. The burden of 
inertia and the status of legal academics both 
speak to the perpetuation of the case and aca-
demic commentary model. With that said, the 
more academics talk and write about the piv-
otal role that elected officials and the people 
play in shaping constitutional values, the more 
likely it is that (over time) the teaching of non-
judicial interpretation will be considered a 
necessary component of the constitutional law 
course. 
My focus, of course, has been on the consti-
tutionallaw course. But limitations in the case 
and academic commentary model apply to 
other subjects. Yet, like constitutional law; the 
case and academic commentary model persists 
(for reasons of inertia and self interest). Unless 
and until casebook editors replace some case 
material with expository text in order to make 
way for substantial excerpts from nonlegal 
sources, legal education will be somewhat 
inefficient and incomplete.17 Admittedly, the 
choice of which cases to cut and which nonju-
dicial sources to add is extraordinarily difficult. 
But the critical importance of nonjudicial mate-
rials to legal training suggests that casebook 
editors at least try to innovate their texts. /!JB 
17 Doug Laycock makes this point in Reflection5 on Two Theme5: Teaching Religiou5 Liberty and Evolutionary 
Change5 in Ca5eboolu, 101 HARV. L. RBv. 1642,1652-54 (1988). For an example of a constitutional law 
casebook written by a political scientist that makes use of expository text this way, see Louis Fisher, 
AMBRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1998). 
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